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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a conviction for receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998). This
Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does evidence that defendant was driving a hot-wired truck with a
smashed dashboard and steering column support a finding that he
knew or had reason to believe that the truck was stolen?
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and
all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, we find that 'the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing

as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."' State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5,
If 19, 999 P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 41-la—1316(2). It provides:
It is a second degree felony for a person:

(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that he knows
or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a peace
officer engaged at the time in the performance of his duty.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jerry Loya, was charged with two counts of receiving or transferring a
stolen vehicle (R. 3-4, 37). Before trial, the State decided to proceed on only one of those
counts (R. 54). After a one-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 129,
150-51). The trial court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen-years at the Utah State
Prison (R. 95-97, 150-51). Defendant timely appealed (R. 152).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 17, 1997, Salt Lake County deputies responded to a radio bulletin
concerning a white Chevy truck pulling a car on a trailer traveling west on Highway
Route 201 (R. 169:91, 93). They located defendant and the truck stopped on a side road
under construction along Route 201 in western Salt Lake County (R. 169:99). A quick
examination revealed that the truck's steering column had been smashed and its ignition
2

switch disabled, and that the truck had been hot-wired (R. 169:106, 115, 141). A record
check on the truck confirmed that it was stolen (R. 169:81-82, 105-06).
A Citizen Complaint
On March 17, 1997, Deputy Henry Beltran, of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Department, received a complaint from a citizen regarding a white Chevy truck last seen
driving west on Route 201 (R. 169:91).l About 9:30 a.m., Deputy Beltran announced
over the department's west-side frequency that he was looking for the truck and that it
was pulling a vehicle on the trailer (R. 169:91, 93).
Several deputies soon located the truck on a side road under construction just off
Route 201 (R. 169:94,98-99, 100, 103, 110, 114). Defendant and another person were
adjusting the tarp covering the vehicle on the trailer (R. 169:99, 103). As Deputy Kevin
Matthews approached defendant, defendant spontaneously told him that the truck had
been loaned to him and that he was just driving it (R. 169:105).
Deputies Beltran, Matthews, Danny Troester, and Jeff Andreason then examined
the truck (R. 169: 94, 106, 111, 115). Inside, they found—as is common with most stolen
vehicles (R. 169:116)—that the steering column had been smashed, the ignition switch
disabled, and the truck hot-wired (R. 169:83, 95, 106, 115, 117, 141). They also found
1

According to the probable cause statement contained in the charging information,
the complaint was made by James McVay (R. 4). McVay had left his red 1978 Pontiac
Trans Am at an address in Salt Lake County to be repaired. On March 14, 1997, he saw
his car being loaded onto a flatbed trailer. He subsequently contacted the police and
complained that his vehicle had been stolen.
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two police scanners in the truck (R. 169:94-95, 111,119, 140, 143, 147). The one clipped
to the driver's side visor was on and locked to the west-side frequency covering this part
of Route 201; the officers could hear themselves conversing over it (R. 169: 95, 111,
147).
A computer check on the truck confirmed that it had been stolen (R. 169: 106,
112). The truck belonged to SKA Drywall and Acoustics, and had been stolen from an *
SKA employee's driveway in the early morning hours of December 30, 1996 (R. 169:8182, 105-06). When the employee Rob Gines went to identify the truck at an impound lot
following defendant's arrest, he noticed that the dashboard and ignition switch had been
torn up (R. 169:83). He also noticed that striping had been added to the truck's exterior
(R. 169:83).
Defendant's explanation.
Defendant called only himself in his defense. He testified that on the morning of
March 17, 1997, he was at his home when two acquaintances, Monique and Jason, arrived
in a white 1996 Chevy truck (R. 169:126-27). Defendant had known Monique for about
one year (R. 169:133). He had known Jason for about six months, but did not know his
last name (R. 169:133).
While visiting with Monique and Jason, defendant received a telephone call from a
friend, Roger Porter. Roger needed to use defendant's truck to tow a car to Grantsville
(R. 169:127). Defendant told Roger that his truck was broken but that he would try to
4

help Roger out (R. 169:128). According to defendant, Jason then offered to let defendant
use his truck (R. 169:128).
Defendant testified that even before he began to drive the truck, which was only
about one year old, he noticed several unusual things about it (R. 169:135). First,
defendant thought it unusual that such a new truck had a big dent in the front fender (R.
169:128-29). However, he accepted Jason's explanation that Jason's mother had recently
crashed the truck into a police car in Idaho (R. 169:128-29).
Defendant also thought it unusual that the truck's ignition was missing (R.
169:129). However, defendant also accepted Jason's explanation that the truck had
"electrical problems" and that Jason was waiting for a part to fix it (R. 169:129, 134).
After receiving instruction from Jason on how to start the truck without the key,
defendant drove to Magna to meet Roger (R. 169:129-30). The two then hooked a flatbed
trailer carrying a covered car onto the truck, took the assembly to the gas station to fill up
the truck with gas, and then returned to Roger's home to pick up another friend, Holly,
who, like them, also wanted to go to Grantsville (R. 169:130-31). The three then began
their trek west on Route 201 (R. 169:131).
Defendant's remaining testimony conflicted with the deputies' testimony on
several key points. First, contrary to the deputies' observations, defendant testified that
neither the steering column nor the ignition sleeve on the truck were damaged (R.
169:134). Second, although defendant admitted that there were police scanners in the
5

truck, he testified that neither of them was on nor was either locked to the Sheriffs
Department's west-side frequency (R. 169:137). Finally, defendant acknowledged that he
told the officers the truck was only loaned to him but claimed that he made the statement
only after he was arrested and placed into one of the deputies' police car (R. 169:136).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Evidence that defendant was driving a hot-wired truck with a smashed dashboard
and ignition switch was sufficient to convict defendant for possessing a vehicle that he
knew or had reason to believe was stolen. Evidence that defendant had a police scanner
tuned to the frequency covering the road on which he was traveling, that he turned off
that road soon after a police bulletin on the truck was broadcast, and that he denied
ownership of the truck before he was even asked further supports defendant's conviction.
ARGUMENT
WHERE DEFENDANT WAS FOUND DRIVING A HOT-WIRED
TRUCK WHOSE DASHBOARD AND IGNITION HAD BEEN
SMASHED, THE JURY COULD REASONABLY FIND THAT
DEFENDANT KNEW OR HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE
TRUCK WAS STOLEN
Defendant claims that the evidence in this case "is not sufficient to infer the
element of intent beyond a reasonable doubt." Aplt. Br. at 9. Specifically, defendant
asserts that evidence "that the truck was started without a key, that scanners were set up in
the truck, and that Mr. Loya admitted to being the driver is fatally weak and amounts to

6

nothing more than conjecture." Aplt. Br. at 8. However, the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom amply support the jury's finding.2
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and
all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] fmd[s] that 'the
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.'" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5,
f 19, 999 P.2d 565 (quoting Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)).
Thus, this Court "do[es] not examine whether [it] believe[s] that the evidence at
trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^J 18, 10
P.3d 346. "'So long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, [the
Court's] inquiry stops.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 16, 418 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (quoting
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)); Heaps, 2000 UT 5, at f 19. This Court

2

Defendant actually states the issue as whether the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss at the end of the State's case. Aplt. Br. at 1. A defendant's motion to
dismiss "requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant must proceed with the
introduction of evidence in his defense." State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985)
(per curiam). To submit a case to the jury, "it is necessary that the prosecutor present
some evidence of every element needed to make out a cause of action." Id. Defendant,
however, analyzes the issue as a claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a
jury verdict. Aplt. Br. at 1-2, 8-14. Where the State's evidence is sufficient to support a
jury verdict, it is necessarily sufficient to support a trial court's denial of a motion to
dismiss. State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 n.2 (Utah App. 1998). Therefore, the State
will address defendant's claim simply as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury's verdict. See id.
7

"simply 'assume[s] that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict.'" Boyd,
2001 UT30,atf 14 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah 1993)).
Under Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2), a person is guilty of receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle if he has "in his possession any motor vehicle . . . that he
knows or has reason to believe has been stolen . . . if he is not a peace officer engaged at
the time in the performance of his duty." Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998). On
appeal, defendant does not challenge that he was in possession of a stolen vehicle or that
he is not a peace officer. He claims only that "the State failed to present sufficient
evidence of intent," i.e., that defendant knew or had reason to believe that the vehicle was
stolen. Aplt. Br. at 6.
"'It is well established that intent can be proven by circumstantial evidence.'"
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at J 21 (quoting Sate v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991));
see also State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997). In such a case, this Court "must
determine (1) whether the State presented 'any evidence' that [defendant] possessed the
requisite intent, and (2) whether 'the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence
have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience' sufficient to prove that
[defendant] possessed the requisite intent." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at % 21 (quoting
Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (additional citation omitted)).
Here, the State presented the following evidence:
(1)

At approximately 9:30 a.m., Deputy Henry Beltran radioed over the Salt
Lake County Sheriffs Department's west-side frequency that he was
8

looking for a white Chevy truck last seen traveling west on Route 201,
pulling a vehicle on a trailer (R. 169:91, 93).
(2)

Shortly thereafter the truck was located stopped along a side road under
construction off Route 201, where defendant was attempting to secure a
tarp that had blown off the vehicle on the trailer (R. :98-99, 100, 103, 110,
114).

(3)

Defendant's first statement to the deputies, made prior to any questioning
and without solicitation, was that "[a] friend had loaned him the truck" (R.
169:105).

(4)

The dashboard and the steering column on the truck were smashed; the
ignition switch was disabled; and the truck was hot-wired (R. 169: 106,
114,141).

(5)

A police scanner clipped to the driver's side visor was on and locked to the
Sheriffs Department's west-side patrol frequency over which Deputy
Beltran's bulletin was given (R. 169:95, 111, 119, 140, 143).

From this evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that defendant knew or had
reason to believe that he was driving a stolen truck. First, reasonable human experience
teaches that most hot-wired cars with smashed dashboards and steering columns are in
that condition because they have been stolen. Based on this evidence alone, the jury
could have reasonably found that defendant knew or had reason to believe the truck was
stolen.
Second, the jury could have found that defendant's unsolicited statement to the
police denying ownership of the truck reflected a consciousness of guilt, since it was "a
curious statement for an innocent [person] to make." State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 1071,
1073 (Utah 1989) (holding that jury could infer intent to commit burglary from
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defendant's unsolicited statement, once he was found in the dwelling unlawfully, "that he
had not taken anything").
Third, the jury could have found the suspicious circumstances under which the
truck was located supported an inference of knowledge. A police scanner in the truck
was locked to the frequency covering the route on which defendant was traveling and
defendant had pulled off that route soon after a search for the vehicle was announced.
Although defendant now counters that he stopped the truck in a conspicuous location off
of Route 201, see Aplt. Br. at 13, nothing in the record supports his claim. The only
evidence before the jury that contradicted the State's reasonable inferences was that
defendant was forced to stop the truck because, in his words, "[t]he car cover come off
the car [he was towing] and was flapping behind the car" (R. 169: 99, 103, 131).
Finally, although defendant argues that this evidence is insufficient because of the
explanatory testimony he gave at trial, see Aplt. Br. at 9-10, 13, the jury was under no
obligation to believe defendant's testimony, especially where it conflicted with the
deputies' testimony on several key points, see Statement of Facts, supra at 6-7. "'[I]t is
the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of
the witnesses"' Boyd, 2001 UT 30, at 1 16 (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345
(Utah 1985)) (emphasis in original). Thus, "[t]he jury need not accept the version
advanced by defendant, but may weigh the evidence and draw its own conclusions and
inferences as to his conduct and intent." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 1986).
10
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For all these reasons, defendant's sufficiency claim fails.3
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £S/L

day of July, 2001.

MARK L, SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KAREN KLUCZNII^
Assistant Attorney General

3

Although defendant devotes a significant portion of his brief contending that
"wired cars are not unusual among people who have limited funds with which to make
repairs," Aplt. Br. at 10-12, defendant presented no evidence at trial to support this
contention or to demonstrate Jason's or defendant's financial condition; moreover, he
never argued this theory to the jury. Thus, that portion of defendant's brief is irrelevant to
his sufficiency claim and should not be considered. See State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960,
966 (Utah App. 1998) (rejecting defendant's sufficiency claim where his argument rested
on affidavits that were not part of the record at trial, noting "[a]ppellate courts of this
state do not consider new evidence on appeal" (citation omitted); State v. Bredehoft, 966
P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998) (same).
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